This study tests whether mutual fund shareholders continue to trade in response to fund returns after they make their initial investment in fund shares. It decomposes the relationship between fund returns and shareholder flow in a large, proprietary panel of all shareholder transactions in one mid-size no-load mutual fund family. Results show that both new and old shareholders buy shares during periods of good returns; however, shareholder outflow is essentially unrelated to fund returns. This lack of a return-sell relationship is not driven by locked-in pension assets, shareholders' ignorance of ongoing fund returns, or embedded capital gains. However, there is evidence that exchanges between equity funds in the family are more correlated with returns of the destination fund than with returns of the origination fund. This may indicate that flow between equity mutual funds is driven by shareholders buying new funds rather than selling old funds.
I. Introduction
Agency problems are pervasive in economics. The literature analyzes a wide range of tools that stakeholders in various organizations deploy to protect their interests from self-serving managers.
In the context of open-end mutual funds, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the traditional tools are relatively unimportant because most of the shareholder-manager agency conflicts are resolved through shareholders' transactions. Their argument is based on two key characteristics 3 shares as they are at account opening. The first contribution of this paper is a comparison of shareholders' account-opening buys with their post-opening buys. The second contribution is a series of tests that drill down to see exactly why shareholders' sells are unrelated to returns.
Studying trading differences between "new" shareholders' account-opening buys and "old" shareholders' subsequent transactions will shed light on the incentives of fund managers. For example, if old shareholders neither buy nor sell in response to ongoing returns, the manager could choose investment policies designed to attract new shareholders-in an attempt to increase fund size and his compensation-even if those policies are costly for old shareholders. Along these lines, Barclay, Pearson, and Weisbach (1998) argue that fund managers make excessive distributions at the expense of old shareholders in an attempt to be more attractive to new shareholders. Christofferson and Musto (2002) suggest that the manager can profitably raise the fees that old shareholders pay in an existing fund while simultaneously opening a clone fund with lower fees (and a correspondingly higher expected return) for new shareholders.
Understanding trading differences between new and old shareholders will also shed light on some of the frictions shareholders face when they trade. For example, if it is costly for shareholders to pay attention to ongoing performance after making their initial investment in fund shares, shareholders' account-opening buys would be more sensitive than their subsequent buys and sells to returns. The analysis may also indicate whether old shareholders have access to alternative investments when making additional contributions or whether they are constrained to invest through their previously-chosen fund (see Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) ). This paper exploits a proprietary database that includes a panel of all shareholder transactions within and across all funds in one mid-size actively managed no-load mutual fund family over a six-year period. The data include comprehensive information about each transaction. Additionally, 4 the data connect each transaction to the shareholder who placed it. This allows transactions to be linked through time and across observable characteristics such as the account's tax status.
The evidence shows that shareholders respond to returns when they place buy orders. In a manner consistent with rewarding the fund manager for good realized performance, both new and old shareholders buy more shares after periods of high fund returns than they do after periods of low fund returns. Old shareholders generate the majority of the number of buy transactions-even after excluding automatic transactions and reinvested fund distributions-but new shareholders are responsible for the majority of the fund's dollar-weighted inflow.
Consistent with prior research, outflow is remarkably constant across all levels of fund returns in the aggregated data: shareholders neither increase their sells during periods of poor returns nor decrease their sells during periods of good returns. These results suggest that the risk of losing assets does not incentivize the fund manager to work hard. For example, if the manager is content with the fund's size-that is, if he is willing to forgo the possibility of large inflow in response to superior future returns-he may choose to reduce his current workload without affecting his current compensation by indexing (part of) the fund's portfolio.
Why are shareholders who are anxious to buy in response to good returns unwilling to sell in response to poor returns? Gruber (1996) conjectures that shareholder flow will not respond to poor returns if it consists of pension accounts that are locked into an inferior menu of funds. The data reject this possibility because the fund family does not have a significant amount of pension assets.
A second hypothesis is that shareholders are unaware of returns after opening their accountsperhaps they sell only in response to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks-because it is too costly for them to pay attention to ongoing returns. The data reject this hypothesis because shareholders, 5 after opening their accounts, buy shares in response to ongoing returns. In fact, new and old shareholders' buys are highly correlated (the contemporaneous monthly and quarterly correlation coefficients are 0.89 and 0.94, respectively), suggesting that they use the same signals to buy shares. Nevertheless, the return-buy relationship is stronger for new shareholders than it is for old shareholders.
A third potential explanation of the buy-sell asymmetry is that accrued tax liabilities make taxable shareholders unwilling to remove assets in response to poor returns. This hypothesis is also rejected by the data: the return-sell relationship for tax-deferred households is, at best, only marginally stronger than that for taxable households.
Fourth, shareholders might move assets from one fund to another in search of better returns.
For example, they might rank the universe of funds each quarter and trade into the fund at the top of the list. 3 Under this model, shareholders do not sell because their current fund performed poorly. Instead, they sell because another fund performed better. To explore this possibility, exchanges between equity funds in the fund family are linked together. Although the evidence is not strong due to the small size of the exchange subsample, it is consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders care more about destination fund returns than about origination fund returns. More broadly, this may indicate that flow between equity mutual funds is driven by shareholders buying new funds rather than selling old funds.
The final test shows that sample selection is important when assessing the return-sell relationship. Ivković and Weisbenner (2006) use a new methodology to suggest that mutual fund shareholders, as a group, sell shares in response to poor returns. Their result is puzzling because it is 6 inconsistent with not only this study but also other studies such as Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and O'Neal (2004) . This paper, therefore, proposes and tests an alternative explanation of their result: their database consists of a particular subset of mutual fund shareholders with a particular trading pattern that is more return-sell sensitive than is the average shareholder. When this study restricts itself to the same type of shareholders and transactions they use, it replicates their finding:
shareholders sell in response to poor returns.
Taken together, the overall results of this paper suggest that shareholder flow is an incomplete monitoring mechanism. Although aggregate shareholder inflow rewards the manager after periods of good performance, aggregate shareholder outflow does not punish him after periods of poor performance. Alternative agency control mechanisms, especially those that are responsive to poor performance, must be important in the mutual fund marketplace (see Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) ). These may include career and reputational concerns of the manager and the fund family (see Chevalier and Ellison (1999) , Farnsworth (2003) , and Gervais, Lynch, and Musto (2005) ). Also, the fund's board of directors might be more active during periods of poor performance than it is during periods of good performance (see Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (2006) ).
Although the incentive feature of shareholder flow in Fama and Jensen (1983) is not present in every model of shareholder flow, most papers suggest that shareholders should both buy and sell shares in response to fund returns. For example, Berk and Green (2004) present a rational model of shareholder flow in a world with neither asymmetric information nor moral hazard. Fund returns signal the ability of the manager, and shareholders react accordingly: "at each point in time. . . [shareholder assets] flow to and from each fund so that the expected excess return. . . is zero" (page 1275). Although shareholder flow does not incentivize the portfolio manager in this 7 model, shareholders still need to be vigilant in watching for poor returns so they can sell accordingly. Lynch and Musto (2003) present a model with very different implications. In their world, the fund family fires individual managers who post poor returns, effectively breaking the link between poor past performance and future returns. Thus, shareholders do not sell in response to poor returns even though they buy in response to good returns.
From a policy perspective, it is noteworthy that retail households sell poor returns while other shareholders do not because many commentators suggest that households are unsophisticated shareholders that need regulatory protection. This paper suggests that households, as a group, are not as passive as previously suggested. In fact, retail households are the most performancesensitive group considered in this paper.
The remainder of the discussion is organized as follows. Section II describes the database used in the analysis. Section III reports the return-flow relationship for both net and gross shareholder flow. Section IV tests whether old shareholders chase ongoing returns. Section V explores alternative motivations for selling shares. Section VI concludes.
II. Data
The data for this study were supplied, generously, by an anonymous mutual fund family. The family is an open-end, no-load complex with fees and policies that are standard in the industry. It is well above the median fund family in terms of total assets under management (i.e., this family is not small), and it sponsors approximately ten actively managed funds, including both equity and fixed-income funds. The equity funds have similar investment objectives; moreover, none is a sector or specialty fund. All fixed-income accounts are excluded from the analysis because they may be traded differently from the equity accounts. Fund shares have been distributed geographically-8 in terms of both number and value of accounts-in a way that closely mirrors the distribution of wealth in the United States, with the exception of a disproportionately large presence in the investment advisor's home state.
The fund family provided an electronic copy of its database for the period between fall 1994 and summer 2000. 4 The database contains three main files: shareholders (well over fifty thousand), transactions (just under one million), and funds (around ten). The shareholder file includes registration information for each account. The transaction file includes all shareholder transactions in each fund. The fund file includes a complete history of net asset values (NAVs) and distributions for each fund.
Fund distributions are removed from the database because they are unrelated to the research question. In particular, shareholders choose whether or not to reinvest distributions when they open their accounts. 5 Even if returns affect this initial choice, they probably do not affect whether shareholders change the reinvestment option going forward. As a practical matter, essentially no shareholders change their reinvestment option after account opening.
In making the distinction between new and old shareholders, it might be helpful to identify all accounts owned by each shareholder throughout the entire sample period. Unfortunately, data limitations make it impossible to do this consistently. This may not be a big handicap because the fund family suggests that only 10-15% of shareholders own more than one account.
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A. Bookkeeping Arrangements
Shareholders have traditionally purchased no-load mutual fund shares directly from the fund.
However, many shareholders now choose to interact with an intermediary (such as a mutual fund supermarket) that collects the transactions of its customers and passes them through to the fund.
The trading technology provided by these intermediaries is generally superior to that which is available to the non-intermediated shareholder. It includes the ability to open multiple mutual fund accounts without completing additional paperwork and the ability to get same-day pricing on asset flow across mutual fund family boundaries. Thus, these shareholders are predicted to trade differently: either shareholders with high preferences for trade self-select the intermediary (a selection effect) or the intermediary's superior trading technologies encourage otherwise identical shareholders to trade differently (a treatment effect).
Some (but not all) of the intermediaries establish "omnibus house accounts" with the fund.
Under this bookkeeping arrangement, the fund does not see the actual transactions placed by the underlying shareholders. Instead, the fund receives a daily report of aggregated gross flow from the intermediary. This arrangement obscures the trading behavior of the underlying shareholders.
For this reason, these accounts are dropped from the database.
B. Shareholder Flow
The unit of observation throughout the analysis is shareholder flow which is computed from individual shareholder transactions. To be consistent with the existing literature, transactions are aggregated to the monthly level and are scaled by lagged total net assets (TNA).
The quarterly and yearly aggregation periods used in prior research are infeasible in this study because the database contains only one fund family over fewer than six year. Unreported re-sults from daily and weekly robustness checks are qualitatively similar to the reported monthly results. However, the highly partitioned subsets used in some of the following regressions are less meaningful under higher frequency aggregation periods because the proportion of periods with no shareholder flow increases as the partition gets finer.
This study focuses on comparing the return-flow relationship across different groups of shareholders (say, groups A and B) by regressing their flow on lagged excess returns. One possible way to scale the data is to aggregate the dollars traded by each shareholder i and divide this sum by the shareholders' lagged TNA as follows:
for each fund n and month t. However, it is hard to compare return-flow sensitivities across shareholder groups if one group is larger than the other group. 6 For this reason, this study uses an alternative methodology that scales each group's aggregated transactions by its own lagged TNA as follows:
This methodology obviously requires that TNA A∪B can be decomposed into TNA A and TNA B .
Whenever this is not possible, the second-best scaling must be used:
This approach rescales the aggregated transactions of shareholder group B to be the same size as that for group A. For example, if lifetime flow from group A is double that from group B, this scaling will simply double flow from group B. Differences in regression coefficients across groups
A and B will reflect, therefore, differences in the timing of the dollar transactions and not simply aggregate differences in their magnitudes.
C. Representativeness
The database contains extraordinarily detailed data that can be used to decompose the withinfund return-flow relationship. However, this benefit comes at a price: the data set covers only one mutual fund family. This raises the question of whether this family's return-flow relationship is different from that of other families. To address this issue, three sets of results are presented in this subsection that can be directly compared with the existing literature. Taken together, this evidence (and evidence presented in Section III) suggests that this family's aggregated shareholder flow is not atypical. There is no compelling reason to believe that the shareholders in this mutual fund family are systematically different in their within-fund monitoring from shareholders in other mutual fund families. Nevertheless, only future research can definitively address this issue.
First, the monthly relationship between shareholder flow and lagged fund returns is shown in Figure 1 . The monthly fund returns are sorted into ten deciles. The average flow in the next month is calculated for each of the ten deciles. The graph reveals a mildly convex association between returns and net flow that is consistent with prior research (see Sirri and Tufano (1998, Figure 1) ).
The analysis is repeated separately for inflow and outflow. It shows that the net-flow relationship is entirely driven by inflow-the outflow graph is comparatively flat (see O'Neal (2004, Figures 4-5) ). This suggests that even though shareholders buy in response to high fund returns, they sell for liquidity or other reasons that are unrelated to the returns of their fund.
Second, the abnormal monthly time t shareholder flow is regressed on aggregates time t flow to funds in its same style group, its own time t−1 flow, its own time t−1 return, its change in Jensen's alpha from t−2 to t−1, and its change in Jensen's alpha from t−2 to t−1 squared. The unreported estimated coefficients from this market model between November 1996 and October 1999 are all within the interquartile range of a similar regression run on each of the 3,388 unique funds in Morningstar's domestic equity category with the exception of the coefficient on lagged returns (79th percentile) and lagged shareholder flow (77th percentile). 7 This relatively high sensitivity to returns should bias this study against the lack of response to returns that is documented in the following sections.
Third, daily net shareholder flow in this fund family is similar to that in the broader fund industry. For example, Greene and Hodges (2002) report that the mean daily net flow in their sample of TrimTabs mutual funds between February 2, 1998 and March 31, 2000 is −0.01%. They report that the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of net flow is −0.06%, −0.01%, and 0.04%, respectively. The median (mean) daily net flow for this mutual fund family over the same time period is within their interquartile range: −0.041% (−0.044%).
7 Paula Tkac kindly provided these calculations. See Del Guercio and Tkac (2003 , Table 1 ).
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III. Do Shareholders Symmetrically Buy and Sell Returns?
If shareholders actively follow the performance of the mutual fund manager, net shareholder flow will be positively correlated with returns. Moreover, gross shareholder flow will also be linked to managerial performance: buys should be higher in good times than in bad times, and sells should be higher in bad times than in good times. In the framework of Fama and Jensen (1983) , it is especially important that sells respond to periods of poor returns.
A. Net Flow
The mutual fund literature measures fund performance many different ways, ranging from the simple (raw returns) to the complex (four-factor alphas). This study uses the fund's excess returns which is defined to be the difference between the returns of the fund and its benchmark index (as listed in the fund's prospectus). This measure helps mitigate concerns about the time-series dynamics of raw returns in up or down years and it will be highly correlated with the the fund's performance relative to its peers (because they track the same index). Unreported robustness checks
show that the main results of the study are not sensitive to this choice. For example, qualitatively similar results are found using just fund returns or fund returns with benchmark returns. Table 1 presents monthly OLS regression results from two specifications of the return-flow relationship for net flow in all accounts. 8 The first specification includes six lagged excess returns, fund dummies, and a constant. The second specification adds concurrent excess returns. Estimates are multiplied by 100; therefore, they can be interpreted as the basis point change in fund size for a 1% change of the independent variables. The estimated standard errors are robust to heteroskedastic disturbances. 9
Specification 2 tabulates the main results. It shows that there is a positive, statistically significant relationship between net shareholder flow and returns for every lag. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders, in aggregate, monitor the fund manager. They buy relatively more when results are relatively good, and they buy relatively less when results are relatively poor. These results are consistent with prior research.
B. Gross Flow
The net-flow model implicitly assumes that shareholders' buying and selling decisions are symmetric. However, a significant amount of the fund's gross shareholder flow crosses each day-even more crosses each month-which suggests that there is an asymmetry in how shareholders buy and sell shares. To explore this issue, net flow is decomposed into gross inflow and outflow. Inflow and outflow are separately regressed on excess returns of the fund, fund dummies, and a constant.
Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models are estimated instead of OLS models. Although SUR produces the same estimates as OLS, SUR allows for the across-equation hypothesis tests that are essential to this study. Table 2 presents two sets of monthly regression results that parallel those from the previous table. 10 The first specification includes six lagged excess returns, fund dummies, and a constant. The second specification adds concurrent excess returns. Estimates are multiplied by 100; therefore, they can be interpreted as the basis point change in fund size for a 1% change of the independent variables.
because the number of regressors exceeds the number of mutual funds in the database (after all, each regression includes fund dummies). Although clustered standard errors can be computed, doing so violates the asymptotic theory used to justify their calculation.
10 Although the bulk of the return-flow mutual fund literature is grounded in net shareholder flow, a handful of recent studies use gross shareholder flow data. Two well-known examples are Edelen (1999) and Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) .
Specification 2 presents the main results. It shows that outflow is, essentially, orthogonal to returns. This contrasts sharply with the strong relationship that exists for inflow. These shareholders are eager to reward the manager for good performance, but they are unwilling to punish him for poor performance. 11 (These results are consistent with prior research.) Is this buy-sell asymmetry driven by shareholders' failure to monitor the fund manager after their initial investment in fund shares, or are other forces-such as taxes-affecting shareholders' propensity to sell?
IV. Do Old Shareholders Chase Returns?
A common view in the literature is that the fund's old shareholders are passive and unresponsive to returns while new shareholders are highly performance sensitive (see, for example, Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) ). If this characterization were correct, the fund manager could exploit the fund's old shareholders in the absence of other monitoring mechanisms. Barclay, Pearson, and Weisbach (1998) argue that fund managers make excessive distributions at the expense of old shareholders in an attempt to be more attractive to new shareholders. Christofferson and Musto (2002) suggest that the manager can profitably raise the fees that old shareholders pay in an existing fund while simultaneously opening a clone fund with lower fees (and a correspondingly higher expected return) for new shareholders.
This section tests whether old fund shareholders respond to returns when buying or selling shares. The first set of tests examines whether shareholders monitor the manager after account opening in the same way they monitor at account opening. The second set attempts to identify subsets of shareholders that have above-average sensitivities to ongoing returns.
A. Automatic Transactions
The mutual fund offers automatic investment and withdrawal plans (AIPs and AWPs, respectively) to its shareholders whereby the fund automatically debits or credits the shareholder's bank account at a prespecified frequency, typically monthly. Unreported results show that more than ten percent of shareholders in non-omnibus house accounts establish an automatic plan at account opening. Table 3 , Panel A reports the distribution of automatic and non-automatic transactions in nonomnibus house accounts. Results shows that AIP buys comprise 46.76% of the total number of all buys. However, AIP buys tend to be small compared with non-AIP buys. This is evident in the fact that AIP buys aggregate to only 1.99% of the total dollar buys in the fund. The table shows that AWP sells are an even smaller part of the fund's total outflow. AIP and AWP transactions are removed from the database because they are a de minimis part of the fund's total flow and they are probably unrelated to ongoing fund returns: only a handful of accounts establish an automatic plan after account opening or terminate one before account closure. Automatic transactions do not appear in any of the following tables in this study.
B. New and Old Shareholders' Buys
Inflow is decomposed into new shareholders' account-opening buys and old shareholders' postopening buys. These variables are separately regressed on excess returns of the fund, fund dummies, and a constant. It is hypothesized that new shareholders are more sensitive than old shareholders to returns due to differences in the investment opportunities available to new and old shareholders. New shareholders are, presumably, unconstrained and choose the fund when it outperforms a group of peer funds (see Gruber (1996) ). Old shareholders, however, might be locked into their fund and buy shares irrespective of ongoing fund returns (see Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) ). For example, old shareholders' ongoing monitoring costs might outweigh any potential benefit of active trade. old shareholders' buys is 0.94 over calendar quarters and 0.89 over calendar months. These results may indicate that old shareholders, rather than being locked into their current fund, face an investment opportunity set that is similar to that for new shareholders. If so, this would support the assertion by Fama and Jensen (1983) that shareholder flow is a sufficient monitoring mechanism 18 for the mutual fund industry.
Although both new and old shareholders buy in response to returns, the new shareholders' response is stronger: their (scaled) estimated coefficients are more than double those from old shareholders in specification 2. Hypothesis tests reported in Table 4 show that all of these differences are statistically significant. These differences may indicate that individual shareholders are less sensitive to returns after making their initial investment in fund shares than they are at account opening, perhaps because the ongoing returns do not provide much incremental information for old shareholders. Alternatively, shareholder heterogeneity might drive the results: after account opening, one group buys returns with the same intensity as at account opening while the other group buys randomly. These hypotheses are explored next.
C. Shareholders Who Open after High or Low Returns
One group of shareholders that may be particularly sensitive to ongoing returns is those who opened their accounts during periods of good returns. "High" shareholders joined the fund when excess returns were above the median; "low" shareholders joined the fund when excess returns were below the median. Future transactions from high shareholders are predicted to be positively correlated with ongoing returns (they have revealed the fact that they trade in response to good returns) while future transaction from low shareholders are predicted to be either uncorrelated with ongoing returns (if they do not pay attention) or negatively correlated with ongoing returns (if they are contrarian). Time-series concerns about entry in "up" or "down" market years are mitigated by the fact that all returns are calculated relative to the fund's benchmark.
This subsection considers two high-low partitions of lagged return. The first one is based on onemonth returns at account opening, and the second one is based on cumulative six-month returns at account opening. Table 3 , Panels C-D show that high shareholders execute both more post-opening buys and more post-opening sells than low shareholders do. High shareholders' transactions tend to be slightly smaller than those from low shareholders. For example, one-month high shareholders place 57.36% of the number of post-opening buys, but these buys aggregate to only 54.14% of the fund's post-opening inflow. Table 5 The inflow results show that high shareholders continue to chase returns after joining the fund while low shareholders appear to ignore ongoing returns. However, the high-low differences are statistically significant for only two return lags in Panel B (note that the low shareholders have very small R 2 s and very large standard errors).
The outflow evidence is contrary to expectations for both shareholder types. High shareholders ignore returns when selling shares while low shareholders sell when returns are poor. In Panel B, four of the seven high-low differences are statistically significant, and the magnitude of the low shareholders' coefficients are especially large (they are the largest outflow coefficients in this study).
This novel decomposition of shareholders supports the hypothesis of shareholder heterogeneity in ex ante return preferences, but the documented buy-sell asymmetry for both high and low shareholders is puzzling. Although it is unclear what motivates the low shareholders to sell poor returns so strongly (after all, they joined the fund when it performed poorly), a possible explanation of the 20 high shareholders' asymmetry is tested below in Subsection V.B.
D. Trading Frequency
Shareholders also differ in the frequency of their transactions. They choose both the number of transactions to place after opening (for example, one or ten) and the time between transactions (for example, one month or one year). This subsection partitions shareholders in real time along both dimensions to test whether the shareholder's prior trading history is correlated with future return sensitivities, ignoring, as always, both automatic transactions and fund distribution. On the one hand, frequent transactions may reflect high idiosyncratic liquidity needs (no-load mutual funds are a low-cost investment vehicle for meeting such needs). If so, future transactions from these shareholders would be uncorrelated with returns. On the other hand, frequent transactions may identify shareholders who actively follow the fund's performance. These shareholders' future transactions would be correlated with returns. Table 3 The dollar-weighted results indicate that shareholders who place many trades make small buys and 12 Neither of the partitions is forward looking. For the number-of-prior-transactions partition, shareholders all start in the few-transactions group. Each shareholder stays in that group until he has made two post-opening transactions, at which point he immediately and permanently switches to the many-trades group. For the time-since-last-transaction partition, all shareholders start in the recent group upon account opening. Shareholders stay in the recent group until six months have passed without an additional transaction. At that point, they switch to the distant group and stay there until they trade again. Thus, shareholders can repeatedly switch between the recent and distant groups. They can also remain in one group for an extended period of time. For both partitions, it is arbitrarily assumed that accounts opened before fall 1994 have not traded since account opening because the database does not contain transactions before fall 1994. Even though their inflow and outflow estimated coefficients are economically large, they are statistically weak (both of the R 2 s are around 3%, 12 of the 14 return coefficients are insignificant, and both hypothesis tests that either the inflow coefficients or outflow coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected). However, transactions from accounts with fewer than two prior transactions (after account opening) are correlated with returns for both inflow (lags 1-6) and outflow (lags 0-2). Because the many-transaction group has large standard errors-the largest in this study for both inflow and outflow-the reported many-few hypothesis tests are not rejected except for lag 3 in the inflow equation (the p-value is 9%). Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the 22 notion that multiple transactions are driven by shareholder's idiosyncratic liquidity needs and not fund returns. 13 Panel B shows that shareholders with recent transactions (i.e., within the previous six months) essentially ignore ongoing returns when buying and selling (unreported tests again fail to reject the hypothesis that either the inflow coefficients or outflow coefficients are jointly equal to zero).
This occurs despite the concern that recent transactions proxy for recent good returns: to the extent shareholders chase good returns, recent transactions could proxy for recent good returns because most post-opening transactions are buys. The evidence also shows that buys (but not sells) from shareholders who have not traded recently are strongly correlated with ongoing returns.
Thus, this panel suggests that trades placed within six months of prior trades are motivated by idiosyncratic liquidity needs rather than ongoing returns. Another important implication is that even shareholders who have not traded for a while continue to monitor the fund, buying additional shares when the fund does well. But neither shareholder group is willing to sell shares when the fund performs poorly.
E. Complete and Partial Liquidations
A final place to look for evidence of post-opening trading heterogeneity is between the two types of sells shareholders can place: those that completely liquidate the account and those that partially liquidate the account. The previous evidence that frequent traders ignore returns suggests that complete liquidations are more likely than partial liquidations to be motivated by poor returns. Table 7 separately regresses complete and partial sells on lagged excess returns. The overall 13 In unreported robustness checks, the regressions are repeated for groups based on 3-or-more to 12-or-more prior transactions. The outflow and few-transaction inflow results are very similar across each of these additional specifications. However, the many-transaction group results differ in four of the ten cases: in groups 3-5, the positive return-buy relationship is statistically stronger than it is in the reported two-or-more specification.
evidence suggests that the return-flow relationship does not differ much across these two types of sells. However, the weak evidence that does exist suggests that complete liquidations are more sensitive than partial liquidations to returns (two lags are statistically significant in the former case while none is statistically significant in the later case).
V. What Motivates Sells?
Why are shareholders who are anxious to buy in response to good returns unwilling to sell in response to poor returns? This section considers three factors that may affect the observed returnsell relationship. The first one is accrued taxes. Shareholders with embedded capital gains may be reluctant to remove assets in response to poor returns. The second factor is reinvesting behavior.
Shareholders may sell in order to reinvest in better-performing funds rather than to get out of a poorly-performing fund. The final one is a quick look at shareholder sampling issues.
A. Taxes
If taxes were an important deterrent, the return-sell relationship in tax-deferred accounts should be stronger than that in taxable accounts. To test this hypothesis, this subsection focuses on the relatively homogeneous subset of non-intermediated retail households (as defined in Subsection II.A) in order to avoid confounding tax effects with other clientele effects than might arise in a broader sample of account types. This subset excludes, for example, trusts, college endowments, institutions, and, of course, all shareholders who invest through omnibus accounts. The outflow results show that for every return lag, taxable and tax-deferred households have a statistically identical response (the inflow results are not of direct interest, but they do indicate that taxable shareholders respond more strongly than tax-deferred shareholders to good returns).
However, the tax-deferred shareholders have more statistically significant coefficients than the taxable shareholders have, and the hypothesis test that the return coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected for tax-deferred outflow but not for taxable outflow. Thus, the evidence on whether tax lock-in affects the buy-sell asymmetry is mixed. The differences that exist are not strong, suggesting that other factors must be important. In particular, taxes do not explain most of the buy-sell asymmetry.
B. Exchanges
Some shareholders might actively trade mutual funds, moving from one fund to another in search of better returns. For example, they might rank the universe of funds each quarter and trade into the fund at the top of the list (see Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) and Bollen and Busse (2005) ). Under this model, shareholders do not sell because their current fund performed poorly. Instead, they sell because another fund performed better. The present data are not ideally suited to test this model because most sells leave the mutual fund family: whether and where the proceeds are reinvested is unknown. Nevertheless, some sells are exchanged into other funds in the 25 family. This subsection compares fund returns on both sides of these transactions to test whether shareholders' exchanges move away from poorly performing funds or towards better-performing funds. The results should be interpreted with care because exchanges make up a small part of the fund's total transaction database All daily shareholder exchanges between distinct equity funds in the family are extracted from the database of shareholder transactions in non-omnibus house accounts. Returns of the destination and origination funds are compared for each transaction for horizons ranging from one day to one year. Table 9 As an additional test, exchanges are aggregated into monthly gross inflow and outflow. These flows are regressed on lagged excess returns in a two-equation SUR framework. The unreported results are weak-due to the small sample-but they are consistent with the notion that exchanges are motivated by the good performance of the desination fund rather than the poor performance of the origination fund.
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C. Shareholder Sampling Issues
In a recent paper, Ivković and Weisbenner (2006) suggest that mutual fund shareholders, as a group, sell in response to poor returns. This finding is puzzling because it contradicts not only this study but also many other studies of the return-flow relationship that use gross shareholder flow data such as Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and O'Neal (2004) . It is important to resolve this inconsistency because their paper is based on a commonly-studied database: investors in one discount brokerage house between 1991 and 1996 (see, for example, Barber and Odean (2000)). Ivković and Weisbenner (2006) argue that their finding is driven by methodological differences: they use raw fund returns to explain outflow while other studies use risk-adjusted returns. However, they are unable to test whether another difference is important: they analyze only retail household investors that self-selected into a particular discount-brokerage house while other studies include each fund's entire shareholder population. They report that the quarterly correlation between the brokerage flow and estimated flow from CRSP data is only 0.50, suggesting that the shareholders in their sample do not trade in tandem with the broader population of mutual fund shareholders. This paper is uniquely suited to show whether part of their finding might be caused by the type of shareholders analyzed: this database includes all shareholders (both households and nonhouseholds) that held or traded shares in the fund, irrespective of the channel through which they came to the fund. Table 10 shows that within-fund shareholder heterogeneity is important and that it probably explains part of their result. In other words, their documented return-sell relationship may be unique to the particular type of shareholders they study.
The first specification repeats, for reference purposes, the original gross-flow model from Table 2 (the coefficients are not identical because automatic transactions are excluded from this version).
The second specification, a proper subset of the first, consists of just retail households (the coeffi-cients in this table cannot be derived from Table 8 because that table used The results show that the household-only subset of shareholders is more sensitive than the entire population of fund shareholders to poor returns when selling: the R 2 increases; the point estimates of the individual coefficients are now all negative, three of them are statistically significant, and the hypothesis test that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected with a p-value of 0.0928.
Another important-but subtle-data difference between this paper and Ivković and Weisbenner (2006, page 6) is that they chose to exclude particular households and transactions from their database: shareholders who make post-opening buys in the same fund and all transactions that follow the first sell in the same fund. In effect, Ivković and Weisbenner (2006) skew their database toward shareholders who do not place many within-fund trades. The evidence presented above in Table 6 suggests that this might introduce an important bias.
Specification 3 tabulates the return-sell relationship for their particular subset of households ("IW Households") by purging similar shareholders from the household database. The evidence indicates that the IW Households are more return-sell sensitive than the overall shareholder population. More importantly, it also shows that IW Households are more return-sell sensitive than the Household Only shareholders: the R 2 increases; the point estimates are larger, more of them are significant, and the hypothesis test that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected with a p-value less than 0.0000. In summary, these results cast some doubt on the return-sell methodological contribution of Ivković and Weisbenner (2006) . At least part of their result appears to be an artifact of the particular type of shareholders they chose to study (which is motivated by their tax focus-they need to calculate the shareholder's tax basis).
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VI. Conclusion
Shareholders of open-end mutual funds hold a noteworthy option that is not available in most organizations studied by financial economists: they can add or remove assets at any time and at a fair price. This ability, if properly exercised, could substitute for regulatory oversight and alternative forms of governance (see Fama and Jensen (1983) ). In order to understand whether fund shareholders are adequate monitors of fund managers, this study tests whether shareholders continue to respond to returns after they make their initial investment in fund shares.
Results show that "new" and "old" shareholders have a similar, positive response to lagged returns when buying fund shares. Additionally, the contemporaneous correlation of inflow from new and old shareholders is 0.94 over calendar quarters and 0.89 over calendar months. These results indicate that old shareholders are not locked into their current fund, buying additional shares without regard to ongoing returns. Instead, it appears that new and old shareholders face similar investment opportunity sets: when new shareholders buy shares, so, too, do old shareholders.
In stark contrast to the buy results, the sell evidence shows that returns do not affect the shareholders' decision to remove assets from the fund. This asymmetric buy-sell relationship is puzzling.
First, why are shareholders unwilling to use the information in poor returns as a signal to sell fund shares when they are anxious to use the information in good returns as a signal to buy fund shares? Second, if poor returns do not cause sells, what does? The data reject the following three potential explanations of the buy-sell asymmetry: pension accounts are locked into an inferior menu of funds; shareholders do not pay attention to the fund's ongoing returns and, hence, do not know when the fund performs poorly; and accrued taxes make shareholders with embedded gains unwilling to remove assets. The data do not reject a fourth explanation: shareholders sell their current fund in order to reinvest the proceeds in a better-performing fund. This explanation is consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders, rather than placing transactions in isolation, strategically sell assets in order to buy other, better-performing assets. Exploring shareholders' transitions from one asset to another as they dynamically update their portfolios may be a profitable avenue for future research.
There is also evidence of shareholder heterogeneity. For example, despite the fact that shareholders, in the aggregate, do not sell in response to poor returns, some shareholder groups do. In particular, the results show that retail households sell when the fund performs poorly. This (and another data sampling issue) may explain why Ivković and Weisbenner (2006) report that mutual fund shareholders, as a group, sell poor returns while other studies report the opposite result. This paper also demonstrates that transactions from shareholders who trade frequently are not related to returns. Instead, these shareholders' trades might be motivated by liquidity needs that are unrelated to fund performance. This may not be surprising because no-load mutual funds are a low-cost investment vehicle through which shareholders can ameliorate small or recurring liquidity shocks. This contrasts with households who frequently trade stocks-their trades appear to be motivated by returns (see, for example, Barber and Odean (2000) ).
Taken together, the results suggest that shareholder flow is an incomplete monitoring mechanism. Although aggregate shareholder inflow rewards the manager after periods of good returns, aggregate outflow does not punish him after periods of poor returns. Future research could focus on how other monitoring mechanisms (such as boards of directors) respond to periods of poor returns.
Of course, it is possible that portfolio managers are adequately incentivized through inflow.
Because the mutual fund industry is growing rapidly, funds that are not keeping up are being punished: they lose their relative ranking according to assets under management, and they are 30 unable to capture larger economies of scale in, for example, fund distribution and other shareholder services. 14 This paper studies the return-flow relationship in mutual funds, shedding new light on how fund shareholders monitor fund managers. However, the findings are grounded in the returns and flow of one mutual fund family. This raises the question of whether the documented return-flow relationships are different from those found in other families. Only future research can definitively address this concern. Nevertheless, the aggregate behavior of shareholders in this family is remarkably similar to that reported in the existing literature, including Bergstresser and Poterba (2002, page 410), Del Guercio and Tkac (2003, Figure 1 ). This suggests that the main results might generalize to shareholders in other mutual fund families. In fact, the database used in this study is titled slightly toward more return-sensitive shareholders than are found in the typical fund (see Del Guercio and Tkac (2003) ).
Thus, the main results of this paper might actually be understated.
14 I thank Sean Collins for making this point. 
Net Shareholder Flow
This table presents two OLS regression models of monthly net shareholder flow on excess returns of the fund (fund minus benchmark), fund dummies, and a constant from all equity funds in one anonymous mutual fund family between fall 1994 and summer 2000. Flow is aggregated from daily non-omnibus shareholder transactions (excluding fund distributions) and scaled by the shareholders' lagged total net assets. All estimates are multiplied by 100; they can be interpreted as the basis point change in fund flow for a 1% change in the independent variable. Robust standard errors are presented below their coefficients. Fund dummies and constants are included in each specification; however, their estimates are not reported. Statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent is denoted with one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. 
Gross Shareholder Flow
This table presents two two-equation SUR models of monthly gross shareholder flow on excess returns of the fund (fund minus benchmark), fund dummies, and a constant from all equity funds in one anonymous mutual fund family between fall 1994 and summer 2000. Flow is aggregated from daily non-omnibus shareholder transactions (excluding fund distributions) and scaled by the shareholders' lagged total net assets. All estimates are multiplied by 100; they can be interpreted as the basis point change in fund flow for a 1% change in the independent variable. Standard errors are presented below their coefficients. Fund dummies and constants are included in each specification; however, their estimates are not reported. Statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent is denoted with one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. New and Old Shareholders' Buys This table presents Fund dummies and constants are included in each specification; however, their estimates are not reported. Statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent is denoted with one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. Trading Frequency
Unadjusted Flow
This table presents two four-equation SUR models of monthly gross partitioned shareholder flow on excess returns of the fund (fund minus benchmark), fund dummies, and a constant from all equity funds in one anonymous mutual fund family between fall 1994 and summer 2000. Partitioned flow is aggregated from daily non-omnibus shareholder transactions (excluding fund distributions and automatic transactions) and scaled by type-specific lagged total net assets (see equation 2). In Panel A, shareholder transactions are partitioned based on the shareholder's number of prior postopening transactions. "Many" shareholder have placed two or more prior transactions after account opening while "few"
shareholders have placed no more than one prior transaction after account opening. In Panel B, shareholder transactions are partitioned based on the time of the shareholder's prior transaction (including time since the account opening).
"Recent" transactions were placed within six-months while "distant" transactions were not. These dynamic taxonomies necessarily exclude each account's opening transaction. Individual shareholders can repeatedly move between the recent and distant groups, but they can only move once from the few group to the many group. Estimated coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 and are presented in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5. Shareholder Sampling Issues
This table presents three two-equation SUR models of monthly gross shareholder flow on excess returns of the fund (fund minus benchmark), fund dummies, and a constant from all equity funds in one anonymous mutual fund family between fall 1994 and summer 2000. Flow is aggregated from daily non-omnibus transactions (excluding fund distributions and automatic transactions) and scaled by lagged TNA of the respective shareholder group. The first specification includes all shareholders; the second specification includes only retail households; and the third specification includes only the type of retail households studied by Ivković and Weisbenner (2006) . All estimates are multiplied by 100; they can be interpreted as the basis point change in fund flow for a 1% change in the independent variable. Standard errors are presented below their coefficients. Fund dummies and constants are included in each specification; however, their estimates are not reported. Statistical significance at ten, five, and one percent is denoted with one, two, and three asterisks, respectively. 
All Shareholders
